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Abstract
We investigate the effects of risk aversion on optimal transmission and genera-
tion expansion planning in a competitive and complete market. To do so, we
formulate a stochastic model that minimizes a weighted average of expected
transmission and generation costs and their conditional value at risk (CVaR).
We show that the solution of this optimization problem is equivalent to the so-
lution of a perfectly competitive risk-averse Stackelberg equilibrium, in which a
risk-averse transmission planner maximizes welfare after which risk-averse gen-
erators maximize profits. This model is then applied to a 240-bus representa-
tion of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, in which we examine the
impact of risk aversion on levels and spatial patterns of generation and trans-
mission investment. Although the impact of risk aversion remains small at an
aggregate level, state-level impacts on generation and transmission investment
can be significant, which emphasizes the importance of explicit consideration of
risk aversion in planning models.
Keywords: risk aversion, stochastic programming, transmission and
generation planning, investment
1. Introduction
Transmission planners in liberalized electricity markets face large amounts
of uncertainty. This includes short-term uncertainty about demand, intermit-
tent generation, and equipment outages, but more importantly, long-term fuel
prices, load growth, construction cost, and policy uncertainty. The amount of
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both short-term and long-term uncertainty is likely to increase even further in
the coming decade, with increasing amounts of renewable generation capacity,
increasing uncertainty about the availability of fossil fuels, and worldwide pro-
liferation of policies to stimulate renewable development. This has implications
for investment, since investments in both transmission and generation capacity
usually have very long lead times of multiple years or even decades, and deci-
sions are not easily reversible (Fuss et al., 2008; Barradale, 2010; Hu and Hobbs,
2010).
To allow transmission planners to make better decisions in this uncertain
environment, stochastic planning models have been developed (see, e.g., De
la Torre et al. 1999; Sauma and Oren 2006; Roh et al. 2009; van der Weijde
and Hobbs 2012; Munoz et al. 2014; Go et al. 2016). However, these models
usually assume risk-neutral transmission planners, and that generation firms
that invest in new capacity following transmission are, likewise, risk neutral.
Most empirical evidence on investments suggests that decision makers, whether
public or private, are instead risk averse.1 Modeling of risk aversion might
change near-term investments, for instance by increasing the attractiveness of
delaying investments in order to gain more information, or by increasing the
value of diverse portfolios of transmission investments that avoid the risk of poor
performance under some future scenarios. Risk neutral stochastic transmission
planning models may therefore a) be inappropriate if the transmission planner
is risk averse and b) incorrectly model the response of risk averse generators to
transmission investment.
Others have analyzed the impact of risk aversion, and therefore the effect of a
simplifying risk-neutrality assumption, on transmission and generation planning
problems; some of this literature is surveyed in Section 2 below. However, the
vast majority of these studies only look at either generation or transmission
investment, and fail to capture the important interactions between the two that
have been identified in the earlier transmission-generation planning literature
(e.g., Munoz et al., 2014; van der Weijde and Hobbs, 2012). Moreover, they are
generally based on very small models, which are not necessarily representative
of large real-world transmission networks and cannot capture the full spatial
patterns of transmission and generation investment.
This paper is a first attempt to investigate the impact of risk aversion on the
results of large-scale electricity planning models that represent the interactions
between transmission and generation investment. We compare the transmission
and generation expansion plans identified by such a model under assumptions of
risk neutrality and risk aversion, to see where risk aversion makes a difference,
and consequently, whether the existing studies and models that assume risk
1As discussed in Munoz et al. (2015), both the Midcontinent and the California Independent
System Operators use engineering rules that aim at identifying “robust" or “least regret"
transmission projects. Although risk aversion is not explicitly mentioned in these studies,
their methodologies suggest that the planning authorities are more concerned with worst-case
situations (i.e., risk averse preferences) than with the expected performance of the selected
projects across all considered scenarios (i.e., risk neutrality).
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neutrality are adequate or not.
We model a proactive risk-averse transmission planner, who maximizes a
risk-adjusted measure for social welfare, and, because transmission expansion
changes nodal electricity prices, anticipates a response by risk averse investors
in generation capacity. As we will see, the solution to this Stackelberg equilib-
rium problem is, under some reasonable assumptions, equivalent to a risk-averse
cost minimization, allowing us to solve the problem at scale for a 240-bus rep-
resentation of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) network
of North America.
Naturally, our approach has limitations: we only model a single decision
stage, the complex interactions between individual generators and between gen-
erators and the transmission planner that occur in real-world imperfectly com-
petitive markets are not fully captured, and we use a simple case study with a
linearized DC representation of the electrical flows on the network. Neverthe-
less, our results do indicate that risk aversion can have impact on the amount
of investment in transmission and generation capacity, on the type of capacity,
and on the spatial distribution of that capacity.
The next section will review some of the existing literature on risk-averse
generation and transmission planning. In Section 3 we describe our methodology
and derive the equivalence of the risk-averse Stackelberg equilibrium problem
and the risk-averse cost minimization. Section 4 summarizes the assumptions
and approach of the WECC case study, the results of which follow in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Existing literature
In this section we first overview different methods to include risk aversion in
planning models. We then briefly review the existing literature on risk-averse
generation and transmission planning.
2.1. Modeling risk aversion
There are several ways to include risk aversion in planning models. In the
economics literature, concave utility functions are popular: these can be used to
convert monetary costs (or profits) into utilities, whose expected value is then
optimized instead of the original objective (Fishburn, 1970). Possible specifica-
tions for the utility functions include exponential functions (exhibiting constant
absolute risk aversion, CARA) and isoelastic functions (exhibiting constant rel-
ative risk aversion, CRRA) (Eeckhoudt et al., 2005). These functions are, of
course, non-linear, which makes including them in large-scale planning models
challenging. If, in addition to investors being CARA risk averse, the distribution
of possible outcomes is normal, the exponential utility function can be written
as a linear combination of expected outcomes and the standard deviation of the
outcome distribution, which is quadratic. This mean-variance utility approach
simplifies the problem significantly, which is one of the reasons for its popu-
larity, but it is, unfortunately, often used in settings where the assumption of
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normality is clearly invalid (such as a stochastic planning problem with a small
number of scenarios).
Another way to model risk aversion, which originates in the financial mathe-
matics literature, is to include the value at risk (VaR) (Duffie and Pan, 1997) or
conditional value at risk (CVaR) (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000) in the decision
maker’s objective or constraints. VaR gives the probability that outcomes are
worse than a given threshold; however, its mathematical properties are unattrac-
tive. CVaR gives the expected outcome over outcomes that are worse than the
VaR. Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) demonstrate that, for a given quantile, the
CVaR can be computed as part of the solution of a simple linear program, which
makes its inclusion in large-scale planning models relatively straightforward.
Finally, robust planning models find the minimum cost solution that is feasi-
ble under a range of potential realizations of uncertain variables (Mulvey et al.,
1995; Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2002). A wide range of different formulations
has been proposed: some only include constraints that enforce feasibility in all
scenarios without considering costs, whereas others are closer to CVaR-based
models in that they minimize worst-case costs or maximize worst-case outcomes.
The advantage of this approach is that the probabilities of future scenarios do
not have to be defined; however, without them, risk aversion is limited to the
worst-case outcome and the expected performance of the solution cannot be
evaluated.
All of these methods have been applied to transmission and generation plan-
ning; Sections 2.2 and 2.3 give an overview of some of these studies and their
results, without aiming to be a comprehensive literature review.
2.2. Risk-averse generation planning
Several studies have used the above methods to consider the effect of risk
aversion on investment in electricity generation capacity, usually in the setting
of a perfectly competitive market. Using theoretical economic models, Neuhoff
and de Vries (2004) show that if consumers and investors are risk averse, and
these risks cannot be traded, competitive markets will not deliver enough in-
vestment because risk premia increase generator costs. Moreover, they skew the
generation mix towards less risky, less-capital intensive technologies, which is
also undesirable from a social perspective, and is a serious barrier to investment
in renewables. Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011a,b) show similar effects using
stochastic equilibrium models with CVaR-maximizing investors or stochastic
discount rates. In their models, which feature uncertain fuel costs, emissions
reduction targets, and numbers of carbon allowances, risk averse investors build
more open cycle gas turbines and less coal-fired generation capacity. This is
because the latter have a higher up-front capital cost and are therefore more
risky; however, they also show that there are important interactions between risk
aversion and model constraints, such as price caps or carbon targets. Fan et al.
(2010), which has investors maximizing utility functions that exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion, shows that the way these carbon targets are implemented
is highly relevant as well. If a carbon taxed or auctioned permit scheme is an-
ticipated, risk averse generators prefer cleaner generation technologies to ensure
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against these regulatory costs. If, on the other hand, grandfathered permits are
considered, this favors investment in carbon-intensive generation capacity.
These papers focus on project-based investment decisions, such that poten-
tial investment in each technology is evaluated separately. Roques et al. (2008)
take a different approach and use mean-variance optimization to investigate how
risk averse investors would choose a portfolio of technologies. They illustrate
the importance of correlations between the uncertain variables in this context:
if, as is often the case, gas prices and electricity prices are highly correlated, this
makes investment in gas-fired generation capacity less risky (as high input price,
which decreases profits, will usually coincide with a high electricity price, which
compensates for the increase in input prices). Hence, risk averse investors favor
gas-fired generation capacity, rather than nuclear or coal-fired. In their model,
electricity prices are exogenous. A similar analysis is done in Huang and Wu
(2008) for Taiwan, but focusing on minimizing the risk-weighted value of total
generation cost. Meunier (2013) shows similar interactions between technologies
in a portfolio-style model with endogenous prices. In this model, investment in
peaking capacity may also increase with risk aversion, not because of exogenous
correlations but because peaking capacity sets prices, which makes it useful to
hedge against the the returns on investment in baseload capacity. The mean-
variance approach has also been applied to wind planning. For instance, Roques
et al. (2010) use this approach to find a portfolio of cross-country portfolios that
minimize the total variance of wind production in Europe. They conclude that
additional cross-country transmission capacity and more coordinated renewable
energy policies in Europe could significantly increase the efficiency of the wind
portfolio. For a general framework on uncertainty and risk analysis in power
system planning, we refer to Merrill and Wood (1991).
Most of the models developed in the papers mentioned above are small, with
a limited number of scenarios, time periods, and generation technologies. An
exception is Jin et al. (2011), which focuses on algorithm design but does show
that large problems can still be solved. Moreover, in all of them, transmission
constraints are ignored. In Kamalinia et al. (2014), which uses mean-variance
optimization to study equilibria in a competitive market, a sensitivity analysis
with respect to the transmission constraints shows that, as may be expected,
these constraints have a major impact on generator’s payoffs, and therefore
on investment and the impact of risk aversion. The latter is not quantified,
however. This study is also one of the few to explicitly consider investment in
renewable generation capacity.
Interestingly, and contrary to what the other studies above seem to suggest,
investment in renewables increases with risk aversion, despite their high capital
intensity. A similar model proposed by Pisciella et al. (2014), which has investors
maximizing a weighted average of expected profits and CVaRs, shows similar
results. Driving these results is the fact that renewable generation is not subject
to direct fuel price uncertainty, or even demand uncertainty in situations where
demand always exceeds renewable generation levels. Its profitability, naturally,
depends on market prices, which are still uncertain. However, since input prices
are not, investment in renewable generation capacity is, in this model, less risky
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than conventional generation capacity, which is subject to but input and output
price uncertainty. Whether this is realistic or not is debatable, but it does
illustrate the impact of how uncertain variables and their realizations can have
a major impact on how investments are chosen.
Risk aversion has also been considered in the real options literature, where
the focus is on the timing of investment. Kettunen et al. (2011) use a multi-stage
stochastic optimization model with carbon price uncertainty and constraints on
the conditional cash flow at risk (i.e., the CVaR of the cash flow). Focusing
on the temporal aspect of an individual investor only, they neither address
technology choice or the system-wide effects of risk aversion; their models also
ignore transmission. They do show, however, that it is important to include
uncertainties, as well as missing markets and other financial details, because
these model features have a large effect in the returns to investment. In a
more general real options setting, Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) illustrate the
importance of differentiating between variability, which can be hedged and leads
investors to postpone decisions, and idiosyncratic risk, which cannot be hedged
and may lead to investments being undertaken too early.
2.3. Risk-averse transmission planning
Considerably less attention has been given to the effect of risk aversion on
optimal transmission expansion plans. Sardinha et al. (2013), using a CVaR-
based transmission planning model with uncertain demand, show that higher
levels of risk aversion can lead to an increase in the optimal amount of trans-
mission in a simple 6-bus network. Delgado and Claro (2013) examine a similar
setting but use multi-objective optimization techniques to analyze transmission
investment in three differently configured 3-bus networks. Their results indi-
cate that the sensitivity of transmission investment to risk aversion depends
on the network configuration. Neither of these studies consider possibilities for
investment in new generation capacity, which seems to at least partially drive
their results. Others have used minimization of maximum regret to analyze
the effects of uncertain transmission outages on transmission expansion plan-
ning in small networks (Alguacil et al., 2010) and large networks (Arroyo et al.,
2010). In these studies, an increase in regret aversion increases investment in
transmission capacity because this mitigates the costs of an outage, but again,
generation investment is not possible.
López et al. (2007) do consider simultaneous generation and transmission
expansion, with the planner maximizing a mean-variance utility function (i.e.,
assuming constant absolute risk aversion, and normally distributed payoffs). In
their model, demand, plant availability, and transmission capacity factors are all
stochastic. Applications on a 6-bus and 21-bus are discussed, but only in terms
of total costs; neither transmission nor generation investments are presented,
and no economic analysis is attempted. Similarly, Zheng and Pardalos (2010)
analyze simultaneous investment in liquefied natural gas terminals and the gas
transmission network in a setting where a planner minimizes costs subject to a
CVaR constraint; they also do not present the optimal decisions, or any type of
economic analysis of those decisions.
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A range of studies consider robust transmission expansion planning meth-
ods. Since these minimize or constrain the cost of the worst possible outcome,
they can be considered as modeling extreme cases of risk aversion. Most of
these studies conclude that uncertainty and risk aversion increase investment in
transmission capacity (for recent examples, see Jabr, 2013; Chen et al., 2014;
Ruiz and Conejo, 2015; Moreira et al., 2015). However, these results are at least
partly driven by the fact that generation investment is not usually endogenous
in robust transmission planning models. If (risk averse) generation planners also
respond to uncertainty, it is no longer obvious that an increase in transmission
capacity is needed to hedge risks. A transmission planner may, for instance,
even reduce transmission investment if generator risk aversion leads to a wider
spatial spread of generation capacity.
Finally, we want to highlight the importance of transmission planning models
that explicitly consider generation investments either in a vertically integrated
setting or in deregulated markets (i.e., generators’ response to transmission in-
vestments). It has been found that co-optimizing transmission and generation
assets simultaneously can yield different transmission investment plans and cost
savings of up to 10% of total system cost compared to generation-only planning
in a vertically-integrated setting (Krishnan et al., 2015).2 More sophisticated,
multi-level equilibrium models have also been proposed to take into account
more realistic features of electricity markets. Sauma and Oren (2006), for in-
stance, shows that a proactive transmission planner that takes into account
generators’ best response to transmission investments can achieve higher social
welfare than a reactive planner. In this model, Sauma and Oren (2006) as-
sume that generators make investments and dispatch decisions sequentially, as
in a closed-loop model, and that they have market power. This model was lat-
ter reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program (Pozo et al., 2013b,a), thus
enabling its application to larger and more realistic case studies, but ignoring
market power.
2.4. The role of financial markets
Most of the literature cited above implicitly or explicitly assumes that risk
cannot be traded: investors do not have the option to insure themselves against
future states of the world in which their profits are low or negative. In reality,
investors can trade in financial markets to hedge many of the risks they are
exposed to. Some examples of financial instruments that are used by investors
to control their exposure to price risks include financial transmission rights,
electricity futures, forwards, swaps, and options (Deng and Oren, 2006). As
Willems and Morbee (2010) show, these financial markets have a significant,
and usually positive, effect on investment levels.
However, financial markets are not perfect. Not all risk can be traded in fi-
nancial markets. This includes some systematic risk (e.g. because of timing dis-
2Note that this equivalent to a competitive market where all generators make both invest-
ments and dispatch decisions simultaneously, in an open-loop fashion.
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crepancies between financial market and energy markets) and idiosyncratic risk,
such as that resulting from policy changes. The most realistic stochastic model
would therefore explicitly model a limited number of financial contracts. The
difficulties of incorporating this complication in a large multi-level investment
model make this very difficult, and to our knowledge it has not been attempted.
An alternative is to assume complete financial markets, such that investors can
trade all types of risk (e.g., there exist Arrow-Debreu securities for all future
scenarios). This reduces the complexity of the problem and, like the assumption
of perfect competition in energy markets, can make risk-averse planning prob-
lems much more tractable (see, e.g., Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2011b). It may,
however result in an overestimation of investment levels and in an underesti-
mation of the strategic interactions between market participants, including the
need for individual investors to hold diversified portfolios, although it is unclear
what the practical implications of the latter would be for aggregate investment
levels.
3. Methodology
3.1. Modeling risk averse equilibria
As the literature suggests, risk aversion has important implications for in-
vestments in generation capacity: the optimal generation mix in a market with
risk-averse agents mix is likely to differ from the one where all the agents are
risk neutral, although the nature and magnitude of these differences depend on
the details of the market in question. Similarly, risk aversion affects optimal
transmission expansion plans. Because transmission expansion changes nodal
electricity prices and hence, incentives for investment in generation capacity,
there are important interactions between transmission and generation expan-
sion planning. The two therefore cannot be considered in isolation, and an
analysis of the effects of risk aversion should simultaneously look at both.
The most realistic approach to do this would be to formulate a stochastic bi-
level risk-averse model, in which generators and transmission planners maximize
a risk-adjusted measure of profits, and different market participants could have
different attitudes to risk. However, because such a model is a mathematical
problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), it is very difficult to solve at the
scale required to investigate the effect of risk aversion in real-world networks
with thousands of transmission elements and hundreds of generators. Multi-
level equilibrium problems are difficult to solve even without risk aversion, and
many traditional bi-level stochastic planning models (such as those developed in
in van der Weijde and Hobbs (2012) and Munoz et al. (2014)) therefore operate
under the assumption that electricity markets are perfectly competitive, which
aligns the objectives of the transmission planner and investors in generation
capacity, such that the problem can be collapsed to a single cost minimization.
This simplification does not in general follow through to risk-averse settings, but
it can be extended to include some special cases of risk aversion, under some
relatively straightforward assumptions.
8
First, we assume that generators maximize a convex combination of expected
profits and the CVaR of the lower tail of these profits and that, as in the models
above, generation investment and generation dispatch levels are continuous vari-
ables and have constant marginal costs,3 to ensure that each generator solves
a linear profit maximization problem. Second, we assume that the electricity
market is perfectly competitive such that each generator is a price taker.4 In
addition, we now also implicitly assume that a complete financial market exists
(i.e., all market participants can trade in financial products that cover every
possible future scenario), although we do not model its equilibrium explicitly.
As mentioned above, this is an obvious simplification since modeling of financial
markets is outside the scope of this work, but it would be even less appropriate
to ignore their (beneficial) effects altogether. It has been shown that, given
these assumptions, the generation dispatch and generation expansion equilib-
rium is equivalent to the solution of a risk-adjusted cost minimization problem
(Ralph and Smeers, 2010; Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2011b)5. This is intuitive
– complete financial markets ensure that the worst-case scenario is the worst
case for every market participant; perfect competition then restores the market
equilibrium to its risk-averse social optimum.
Finally, we assume that the transmission planner acts as a Stackelberg leader
who maximizes a convex combination of expected social welfare and the CVaR
of the lower tail of the social welfare distribution and use the same weights
and CVaR thresholds as the generators. Given that we already know that
the generator’s equilibrium is equivalent to the outcome of a risk-averse cost
minimization, it is then straightforward to prove that solution to the whole bi-
level transmission-generation problem can also be found through a risk-averse
cost minimization. To see this, we can write the full bi-level problem as follows:
max
x
f (x) + g (y) (1)
s.t.
F (x) ≤ 0 (2)
y = arg max
y
g (y) s.t. G (x, y) ≤ 0 (3)
The function f (x) is the (risk-averse) cost of transmission expansion, g (y) the
(risk-averse) cost of generation and G (x, y) a set of constraints on generation
that link the two. The reduced problem is simply the following one:
3It is possible to use piecewise linear cost functions to approximate increasing marginal
costs
4More general assumptions are possible, for an example see Sauma and Oren (2006) and
Pozo et al. (2013b).
5e.g., if all market participants minimize a weighted average of expected costs and the
CVaR of the lower tail of the cost distribution, the equivalent single optimization problem
minimizes the sum of the individual participants’ objectives
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max
x,y
f (x) + g (y) (4)
s.t.
F (x) ≤ 0 (5)
G (x, y) ≤ 0 (6)
Assume we have found a solution {x∗, y∗}to the reduced problem. Then,
by Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (Bellman, 1952), given x∗, y∗ must satisfy
Eq. 3, and hence, the two problems are equivalent. Hence, as in the risk-neutral
case, we can collapse the bi-level equilibrium problem to a (linear) optimization
problem, as long as the assumptions outlined above are met.
3.2. Model structure
To introduce the model we first describe the nomenclature. With the excep-
tion of the parameters α, Φ, and ω, we use capitalized letters for all sets and
parameters.
Sets and indices
B set of buses, indexed b
Bp subset of buses in state (subregion) p
Bj subset of buses in control area j
H set of representative dispatch periods, indexed h
G set of generators, indexed i
Gb subset of generators at bus b
Gj subset of generators in control area j
Gp subset of generators in state p
GR subset of renewable generators
GC subset of candidate generators
GE subset of existing generators
GN subset of intermittent generators
N set of intermittent generators, indexed n
J set of control areas, indexed j
L set of transmission lines, indexed l
Lb subset of lines connected to bus b
P set of states, indexed p
S set of scenarios, indexed s
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Parameters
α confidence level on CVaR
ω weight on CVaR
Φbl bus-line incidence matrix
CXi annualized capital cost of generation [$/MW-yr]
CZi annualized capital cost of transmission [$/MW-yr]
Dbh electricity demand [MW]
Dbh∗ peak electricity demand [MW]
ELCCi effective load carrying capability [%]
Fl line limit [MW]
INp fraction of RPS requirement that has to be meet using in-state resources [%]
MCis marginal cost of generation [$/MWh]
Ps probability of scenario s
PTDFlb power transfer distribution factor
RMj reserve margin [%]
SRPSp state renewable target [%]
FRPS federal renewable target [%]
Lh length of period h [hrs]
Wih hourly availability of generator [%]
X0i installed generation [MW]
Xi maximum resource potential [MW]
Zl maximum buildable capacity in transmission corridor [%]
Decision variables
ζ value at risk
as auxiliary variable for CVaR
cihs curtailed demand [MW]
cvar CVaR
fus non-compliance with federal renewable target [MWh]
sups non-compliance with state renewable target [MWh]
sulbs non-compliance with aggregate state renewable targets [MWh]
rbhs net injection [MW]
xi investment in generation capacity [MW]
zl investment in transmission capacity [MW]
yihs generation dispatch level [MW]
We formulate the investment-planning problem as a two-stage stochastic
program. The first-stage decision variables correspond to generation and trans-
mission investment levels, denoted xi and zl, respectively. The expression CC
corresponds to sum of the annualized investment costs, which we define as fol-
lows:
CC =
∑
i∈G
CXixi +
∑
l∈L
CZlzl
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In the second stage there are economic dispatch decisions for dispatch period
in each scenario s of economic, market, and regulatory conditions. We denote
OCs the operating cost of the system for a representative year in the future.
OCs =
∑
h∈H
Lh
(∑
i∈G
MCisyihs +
∑
b∈B
V OLLcbhs
)
+NC
fus + sulbs + ∑
p∈P
sups

Note that the expression OCs also accounts for the opportunity costs of
curtailed demand through the Value of Lost Load (V OLL) and non-compliance
with state and federal renewable targets through non-compliance fines (NC),
which are assumed to be equal for all federal and state RPS systems. Given
these expressions, we define the objective function of the optimization problem
as follows:
min CC + (1− ω)
∑
s∈S
PsOCs + ωcvar (7)
For ω = 0, the problem minimizes the sum of capital cost plus the expect
value of operating costs across all scenarios s ∈ S. For ω = 1, the objective
of the planning problem becomes the minimization of the Conditional Value at
Risk, the expectation of the cost over the most costly α% of scenarios only6,
denoted with the auxiliary variable cvar. For 0 < ω < 1, the problem effectively
puts a higher weight on the most costly α% of scenarios. Note that since the
annualized investment costs CC only depend on first-stage variables—which are
not dependent on the second-stage scenarios—this term is not weighed by the
parameter ω and it is outside of the cvar expression.
The co-optimization of transmission and generation investments is done sub-
ject to a series of constraints that we describe as follows:
CVaR constraints: We use the linearized formulation of the Conditional Value
at Risk proposed by Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) as follows:
ζ +
1
1− α
∑
s∈S
Psas ≤ cvar (8)
as ≥ OCs − ζ ∀s ∈ S (9)
Market clearing constraints: The difference between generation and demand
equals a net injection at every bus in the system.∑
i∈Gb
yihs + cbhs−Dbhs = rbhs ∀b ∈ B, ∀h ∈ H,∀s ∈ S (10)
Generation limits: We assume that all generators are dispatchable. To model
the intermittency of renewable resources, including hydro, wind, and solar, we
6Note that ‘most costly’ is endogenously defined – the model will determine which scenarios
are the most costly considering that decisions have been optimized
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limit the dispatch of these technologies to a fraction of their nameplate capacity
through hourly availability factors (Wih). For all non-intermittent generation
technologies, the parameters Wih are equal to 1.7
yihs ≤Wih(X0i +xi) ∀i ∈ G,∀h ∈ H,∀s ∈ S (11)
Transmission limits: Since we define net injections per bus, we enforce both
thermal limits and Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law simultaneously using Power Transfer
Distribution Factors (PTDFs) through a single set of constraints.8
Tlzl ≤
∑
b∈B
PTDFlbrbhs ≤ Tlzl ∀l ∈ L,∀h ∈ H,∀s ∈ S (12)
Net injections:∑
b∈B
rbhs = 0 ∀b ∈ B, ∀h ∈ H,∀s ∈ S (13)
RPS constraints: We enforce one federal renewable target for all eligible states
(14) and individual renewable targets per state, as in Short et al. (2011) and
Munoz et al. (2014). Recall that these are soft constraints, since we allow for
non-compliance with federal and state renewable targets. We also allow for the
possibility of trading of Renewable Energy Certificates between states through
the combination of constraints (15) and (16), as specified below. Constraint (15)
imposes the minimum fraction of the renewable target that has to be met using
in-state resources. Constraint (16) ensures that the sum of all state renewable
requirements are met using renewable resources within the WECC region. This
same formulation was used in Perez et al. (2016).∑
h∈H
Lh
∑
i∈GR
yihs + fus ≥ FRPS
∑
h∈H
Lh
∑
b∈B
Dbhs ∀s ∈ S (14)
∑
h∈H
Lh
∑
i∈GR∪Gp
yihs + sups ≥ INpSRPSp
∑
h∈H
Lh
∑
b∈Bp
Dbhs ∀p ∈ P,∀s ∈ S
(15)∑
p∈P
∑
h∈H
Lh
∑
i∈GR∪Gp
yihs + sulbs ≥
∑
p∈P
SRPSp
∑
h∈H
Lh
∑
b∈Bp
Dbhs ∀s ∈ S (16)
7A more general formulation would consider the Forced Outage Rates of conventional
generators, in which case Wih would be set equal to (1 − FORi). Such change would not
change our basic results.
8Our formulation does not account for changes in the reactance of transmission lines due
to the investment of new transmission capacity, which is the same simplification used in
Sauma and Oren (2006) and Short et al. (2011). This relaxation could bias the location
and magnitude of transmission and generation investments (Munoz et al., 2013). However,
accounting for changes in the reactance values would result in a non-linear and non-convex
model. Solving such model would require application of a customized algorithm, as the one
proposed in Ozdemir et al. (2016). The application is beyond the scope of this article since
our emphasis on analyzing the impacts of risk aversion.
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Generation build limits: These constraints limit investments in new generation capac-
ity depending on the location and type of technology.
xi ≤ Xi ∀i ∈ G (17)
Transmission build limits: We constrain the amount of capacity that can be
added to a transmission corridor in the system. Note that the variable zl is
expressed in MW and the parameter Zl is expressed as a fraction of a reference
transmission line with capacity Tl.
zl ≤ ZlTl ∀l ∈ L (18)
Installed reserves: For the purpose of calculating contributions to installed re-
serve margins, we derate the capacity of intermittent generation technologies
using Effective Load Carrying Capability factors (ELCC) that are based on
historical data.9∑
i∈GNI∩Gj
(X0i + xi) +
∑
i∈GI∩Gj
ELCCi(X
0
i + xi)
≥ (1 +RMj)
∑
b∈Bn
Dbh∗s ∀j ∈ J, ∀s ∈ S (19)
Nonnegativity:
xi, zl, yihs, cbhs, rbhs, fus, sups, as ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G,∀l ∈ L,∀h ∈ H,∀p ∈ P,∀s ∈ S
(20)
4. Case study: WECC 240-bus system
4.1. System description
We perform our numerical studies using a 240-bus network reduction of
the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC). The original dataset
was made available by Price and Goodin (2011) and later expanded by Munoz
et al. (2014) to perform transmission and generation investment-planning stud-
ies. The system has 448 transmission lines and 157 aggregated existing gen-
erators. Figure 1 depicts the approximate location of all existing buses and
transmission lines in the system.
For transmission upgrades we consider two types of investment alternatives.
For existing transmission corridors we allow for the addition of the equivalent
9This is a frequently-used approach to account for variability of renewable resources in
resource adequacy studies. However, it is known that the capacity value of renewable energy
technologies—solar in particular—decreases rapidly at increasing penetrations. A method to
account for this dependency is proposed in Munoz and Mills (2015). In many markets, the
capacity of conventional generators is also derated by expected forced outage rates, but we
omit that detail here.
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Stochastic transmission and generation planning
Fig. 1 Illustration of the WECC 240-bus system (Munoz et al. 2014)
Table 1 Sensitivity analysis of renewable supply as a function of λ
λ ($/MWh) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Renewables (%) 7.5 10.3 14.8 20.1 25.1 28.7 31.7 33.7 37.5 37.9 38.2
7.2 Selection of the price ceiling of renewable energy certificates (λ)
We select the value of the price ceiling of Renewable Energy Certificates (λ) to enforce
the renewable target constraint by performing a sensitivity analysis on a linear relax-
ation of the mixed-integer planning problem. To ensure that the variability of time-
dependent resources is at least partially represented, we use 50 representative scenarios
obtained using the clustering methodology described in Sect. 4. We enforce a 33 %
renewable target across all regions that belong to the WECC, which is analogous to
one of the regulatory scenarios analyzed in Munoz et al. (2014).
As shown in Table 1, not enforcing a renewable target (λ = 0) would only result in
a 7.5 % of demand being supplied from renewables. Such investments occur for purely
economic reasons and do not require additional revenue streams from the production
of RECs to be cost-effective. Raising the price ceiling λ naturally yields a monotonic
increase in the penetration of renewables. We find that a price ceiling of $70 per MWh
results in a 33.7 % penetration of renewables (Table 1), which meets the target. All of
the remaining numerical experiments are run assuming λ = 70 ($/MWh). The true
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Figure 1: Illustration of the WECC 240-bus system (Munoz et al., 2014).
of up to two new 500 kV circuits and do not consider the possibility of creat-
ing new transmission corridors between existing buses. We also allow for the
interconnection of renewable hubs to existing buses through radial transmission
lines with up to four 500 kV circuits. As implied in the model description in the
previous section, we assume that both transmission and generation investments
can be made in small incremen s.
Installed and available generation capacity for new investments are listed in
Tables A.6 and A.7, respectively, in the Appendix. We assume that demand
can be curtail d at a price of 1000 $/MWh, which is the price ceiling for most
markets in the US. For renewables, including solar, wind, and hydro, we model
variability using hourly capacity facto s from historical data fr m the year 2004.
As in Perez et al. (2016), we use 10 representative hours of historical data. A
detailed description of the dataset is provided in Munoz (2014), Appendix B.
4.2. Timing
In the real world, transmission and generation expansion decisions are made
on a rolling basis. The full problem would therefore be a multi-stage or rolling
horizon stochastic optimization problem. Due to their size, these problems are
difficult to solve even for risk-neutral models with small numbers of scenarios
and therefore beyond the scope of this paper. However, we also cannot simply
ignore opportunities for recourse: we would significantly overestimate the effects
of risk aversion if decision makers were stuck with the effects of their decisions,
without any opportunities for further investment, for a long period of time.
We therefore approximate the multi-stage problem by only considering a
single decision year, 2034, and annualizing investment costs. This implies that
decision makers only incur the costs of their decisions for one year. Of course,
we may now understate the results of risk aversion but, since in the real world
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investment decisions are often taken annually, our results will be more repre-
sentative of a real-world planning situation than those obtained from a model
with a much longer planning horizon and no recourse options.
4.3. Costs
We assume that the capital cost of all generation technologies for the decade
that leads to 2034, which is when investors will commit to the construction of
generation capacity for 2034, will be the same as the ones projected by the US
Energy Information Administration today (EIA, 2013). Table 1 shows overnight
capital cost, fixed O&M, and net present costs (NPC) for all generation tech-
nologies available for investment in the model.
Table 1: Capital costs of generation investment alternatives.
Overnight Fixed
Technology Capital Cost O&M Lifetime NPC CX
($/kW) ($/kW-year) (years) ($/kW) ($/kW-yr)
Coal 4,579 63.21 40 5,664 330.07
CCGT 978 14.39 30 1,199 78.01
CCGTCCS 2,060 30.25 30 2,525 164.26
CT 665 6.7 30 768 49.96
Wind 2,438 28 25 2,833 200.98
Solar 5,400 22 25 5,710 405.14
Biomass 3,860 103 30 5,443 354.10
Geothermal 4,141 84 30 5,432 353.38
Hydro 3,500 15 25 3,711 263.33
The NPC corresponds to the present capital cost of generation, considering
both overnight and fixed O&M costs for the lifetime of each technology, using a
discount rate δ of 5% per year. Since the planning model optimizes investments
for one representative year in the future, we compute the annualized capital cost
CX that is then used directly in the optimization model.10 For transmission
we use the cost estimates detailed in Munoz (2014). To compute the annualized
investment costs of transmission CZl, we assume that transmission assets have
a lifetime of 50 years and assume the same discount rate δ=5% is used for
generation investment alternatives.11
We enforce both federal (constraint (14)) and state (constraint (15)) Renew-
able Portfolio Standards only in the US portion of the WECC, excluding areas
of Canada and Mexico. Table 2 shows renewable targets for all states in the
10We compute the annualized generation investment cost using the formula CX =
NPC
(
δ
1− 1
(1+δ)LT
)
, where LT is the generator lifetime in years.
11The capital cost of all transmission investment alternatives are listed in Munoz (2014).
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WECC with binding mandates. These are the same projections of RPS targets
utilized in Munoz et al. (2014).12
Table 2: State-level RPS targets.
State AZ CA CO MT NM NV OR UT WA
RPS 15% 33% 30% 15% 20% 25% 13% 20% 12%
Non-compliance with renewable targets is allowed at a cost of $50 per MWh
for all states, which is an approximate lower bound for existing fines in the
WECC region (Perez et al., 2016). Non-compliance with RPS policies can be
also interpreted as the trading of Renewable Energy Certificates between a fringe
market and WECC states at a price of $50 per MWh, in which case a fraction
of the RPS policies within the WECC would be met using eligible renewable
resources outside of the WECC region.
4.4. Scenarios and risk aversion
Most stochastic transmission and generation planning models use a limited
number of scenarios (usually less than 10) for computational reasons. To inves-
tigate the effect of risk aversion using CVaRs, this is not enough: as in the real
world, we need to consider low-probability/high-consequence scenarios that can
have a significant effect on expected profits or welfare if they occur. Moreover,
the smallest meaningful CVaR threshold level α in a model with s scenarios
is 1/s, while typical threshold values are closer to 5%. We therefore define 24
scenarios, which cover a range of possible policy, demand, and cost changes
from now until 2034. The scenarios are based on four policy and demand sce-
narios WECC has recently constructed for use in its long-term planning studies
(WECC, 2013). The WECC scenarios describe sets of policies consistent with,
respectively, a focus on economic recovery, a focus on clean energy, a focus on
short-term consumer costs, and a focus on long-term societal costs, and thus
span a broad range of possible futures. Key parameters of these scenarios are
summarized in Table 3.
In addition to policy and demand parameters, generation investment is heav-
ily influenced by relative prices of coal and gas, which the WECC scenarios do
not fully capture. We therefore define a separate set of three fuel prices scenar-
ios, which are summarized in Table 4 and are broadly in line with predictions
made by the International Energy Agency and the US Department of Energy.
12Note that the projections of renewable mandates used in Munoz et al. (2014) are only
approximations of the actual regulations in place. The state of Colorado, for instance, imposes
different renewable targets for investor-owned utilities (30%) and municipalities (10%). For all
states with RPS mandates such as the one in Colorado we use the maximum enforced target,
assuming that climate change concerns will actually drive renewable targets towards more
stringent levels than the ones considered today. Perez et al. (2016) proposes a deterministic
planning model with more realistic features than the ones we consider in this article, including
explicit modeling of the geographical eligibility and trading of Renewable Energy Certificates
between states. However, replicating RPS policies in the WECC with such level of detail is
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WECC1 WECC2 WECC3 WECC4
State RPS Current Current+50% Current-50% Current+50%
Minimum
in-state RPS
requirement Current None Current Current but no
in-state
requirements
for 50% increase
Federal RPS None Min. 15% None Min. 15%
Peak demand
growth/year 1.6% 0.1% 0.8% 1.1%
Avg. demand
growth/year 1.9% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0%
Carbon cost $58/ton $100/ton $0/ton $75/ton
Table 3: Policy/demand scenarios
Cheaper gas Cheaper coal Current levels
Gas price $2/MMBtu $10/MMBtu $5/MMBtu
Coal price $2.50/MMBtu $1.50/MMBtu $2/MMBtu
Table 4: Fuel price scenarios
A third important determinant of generation investment is the availability of
nuclear capacity, which, as history has shown, can change rapidly in response to
nuclear accidents; a third set of two scenarios, which are summarized in Table 5,
captures these possibilities. The 50% retirement of nuclear capacity corresponds
roughly to the amount of nuclear generation capacity in WECC constructed
before 1990, which s also similar to the amount of nuclear capacity retired by
Germany in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster; it is therefore our best
estimate of the magnitude of a government response to a nuclear accident.
To construct our final set of 24 scenarios, we simply take the Cartesian
product of the four WECC policy/demand scenarios, the three fuel price sce-
narios, and the two nuclear scenarios, in the absence of any evidence to support
correlations between the probabilities of scenarios in each set. For simplicity,
we assume that each of the 24 scenarios is equiprobable, although of course
other assumptions could be made. We will initially use a CVaR threshold of
beyond the scope of this article.
Status quo Nuclear accident
Nuclear capacity Current levels Current levels -50%
Table 5: Nuclear scenarios
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Figure 2: Costs in individually optimized scenarios
α = 0.916, such that the CVaR selects the two highest-cost scenarios, and vary
the weight on the CVaR, ω, from 0 (risk neutrality) to 1 (extreme risk aversion).
In section 5.4, we explore the effect of changing α.
Figure 2 shows the system costs for individually transmission-optimized sce-
narios, i.e., the system costs if one scenario is known to occur with probability
1. The bars marked "N" are the scenarios in which nuclear capacity is reduced.
As this figure shows, there is significant variation in system costs between the
scenarios; as may be expected, scenarios with higher RPSs, lower coal rather
than lower gas prices, and less nuclear capacity are more costly. That does not
necessarily imply that these scenarios are the most risky in a stochastic plan-
ning framework—although they are likely to be—but it does show that some
scenarios are inherently more costly, even if they are anticipated.
5. Results
5.1. Investment, costs and risk
Figures 3 and 4 show how investment in transmission (backbones and inter-
connections to renewable hubs) and generation change with ω, the weight on
the CVaR of the tail of the cost distribution in the objective function. A higher
ω implies a higher weight on the more costly scenarios, and hence, a higher level
of risk aversion; when ω = 0, investors are risk-neutral. As these figures show,
the impact of risk aversion on these aggregate transmission and generation in-
vestment levels in the WECC is minor. Investment in generation increases
slightly with risk aversion, as does investment in interconnection capacity to
renewable hubs. Investment in transmission backbones decreases slightly with
moderate levels of risk aversion, since it is a substitute for generation in some lo-
cations, and increases again for extreme risk averse cases to accommodate more
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Figure 4: Generation investment
renewable investment in different locations. The total amount of transmission
investment increases slightly with risk aversion.
We will discuss the reasons for these changes in more detail when we look at
the spatial distributions of investment, but before we do so, it is worth exploring
why risk aversion seems to have such a limited effect on overall levels of gener-
ation and transmission investment. To do so, Fig. 5 shows how the cumulative
probability density function of costs changes if we move from a risk-neutral case
(ω = 0) to a moderately risk-averse case (ω = 1/2), and a case in which only
costs in the worst few scenarios enter the objective function (ω = 1). This sug-
gests several reasons for the limited effect of risk aversion. First, a small change
in the patterns of investment already significantly reduces the costs in the worst
few scenarios, suggesting that the objective function is relatively flat around its
optimum. There are relatively cheap actions that can be taken to reduce expo-
sure to risk (e.g., investment in renewable capacity, which in some locations is
already close to competitive in a risk-neutral model); naturally, these increase
costs in low-cost scenarios, but the trade-off is not severe. Secondly, once these
actions are taken, there is little that can be done to further reduce risk. Even
if investors only consider the worst scenarios, costs in those scenarios cannot be
reduced further. In Fig. 5, these worst scenarios are scenarios with high RPS
levels, high demand growth, and high fuel prices. Even if investors had certainty
that one of these would occur, there is no ‘get out of jail free’-card – costs can
be reduced somewhat, but these futures are still expensive, as Fig. 2 already
indicated. These two reasons also explain why, as Fig. 5 shows, the level of risk
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aversion seems to matter little once we move to a case with ω > 0.
The existing literature suggests a third reason for the relative insensitivity
of total investment levels to risk aversion. In risk-neutral stochastic planning
models, it has been shown that the number of scenarios is of relative unimpor-
tance, while the range of scenarios is an important driver of model outcomes
(Hobbs et al., 2015). This suggests that the most extreme scenarios drive much
of the results of a risk-neutral model, and hence, putting an even higher weight
on them in a risk-averse model does not change the results significantly.
5.2. Generation investment
Figure 7 shows how investment in the various different types of generation
capacity changes as a result of an increasing weight ω on costs in the worst
scenarios, relative to the risk-neutral solution (see Figure B.10 in the Appendix
for more details on the risk-neutral solution). There are no appreciable changes
in hydro and coal investment, both of which are low in all scenarios because
of limited opportunities of expansion and environmental constraints. As this
figure shows, in our model higher, levels of risk aversion lead to more invest-
ment in low-carbon technologies, particularly wind and solar. Investment in
the most carbon-intensive technology, open-cycle gas turbines (CT), decreases
significantly with risk aversion.
As mentioned above, the highest-cost scenarios are those with high state
and federal RPSs and high fuel prices. It is therefore not surprising that the
best hedge against those scenarios involves investing in renewables, which helps
to meet RPS targets and, once constructed, their variable costs do not depend
on fuel prices. This effect is not universal. In markets where there are current
high levels of support for renewables through feed-in tariffs or other mechanisms
which directly effect the marginal profits of generators, and high probabilities
that these support mechanisms are stopped, renewables may well be riskier,
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Figure 6: Generation investment changes by type relative to the risk neutral solution.
and investment would decrease with risk aversion. In addition, short-term un-
certainty could increase risks related to renewable developments (Seljom and
Tomasgard, 2015). In our setting, with our scenarios, however, they help reduce
policy and fuel cost risk. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that US investors
are increasingly looking at renewables for these purposes (Haemig, 2015).
In general, it is notable that the differences in investment levels for CTs
and wind between risk-neutral and risk-averse models is much higher than the
difference in total investment levels. Thus, even if risk aversion has a minimal
effect on total investments or costs, there are still significant differences in the
generation mix.
A similar, even more striking effect can be observed in the spatial patterns
of investment. Figure 7 shows how the spatial distribution of generation invest-
ment changes as a result of an increasing weight ω on costs in the worst scenar-
ios, relative to expected costs. Again, the differences between risk-neutral and
risk-averse results are much bigger in some individual states, such as Arizona,
than the net investment differences, and certainly large enough to be of major
interest to local policy makers and planners. The spatial patterns are mostly a
result of the presence of good renewable resources, existing transmission capac-
ity, and renewable policies. The largest differences can be observed in Arizona,
which has excellent renewable resources and is well-connected to California and
other coastal states with relatively high RPSs, and where risk aversion leads
to a significant increase in generation investment. In neighboring New Mexico,
on the other hand, investment decreases, because it is less well connected and
can now import generation from Arizona. Generation investment in California
is relatively independent of risk aversion compared to Arizona, New Mexico,
and Wyoming, partly because it benefits from the increased investment in Ari-
zona and because RPSs are already high at present, leading to large amounts
of investment in any scenario and thus less exposure to policy risk.
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Figure 7: Generation investment changes by location relative to the risk neutral solution.
A final observation from both these figures is that the effects of risk aversion
are often non-monotonic, likely because of the complex interplay between the
various renewable constraints and between generation and transmission invest-
ments. Besides, cost functions for generation and transmission are linear, which
implies that a small change in the model input parameters can lead to a large
change in the primal solution variables. This implies that these interactions
need to be modeled carefully before policy is designed, and that they cannot be
considered in isolation.
5.3. Transmission investment
Figure 8 shows how the spatial distribution of transmission investment changes
as a result of an increasing weight ω on costs in the worst scenarios, relative to
the risk-neutral solution (see Figure B.11 in the Appendix for more details on
the risk-neutral solution). As we have already seen above, the total amount of
transmission capacity increases slightly with risk aversion; as with generation,
the differences in individual states are much larger. In some states, such as
Arizona, transmission is clearly a substitute for generation, and because of the
sharp increase in generation investment in the risk averse case, the transmis-
sion planner can reduce its investment there. In other states such as Wyoming,
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transmission investment to renewable hubs increases, anticipating more invest-
ment in renewable generation capacity. Existing capacities play an important
role here, too; transmission investment in California is noticeably higher under
risk-averse than under the risk-neutral assumptions, even though generation in-
vestment does not change much, such that surplus of renewable power can be
exported to other states in scenarios without in-state RPS requirements.
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Figure 8: Transmission investment changes by location relative to the risk neutral solution.
The effects of risk aversion on transmission investment are therefore very
different from state to state. As with generation investment, they are also
highly non-monotonic, making prediction difficult.
5.4. Sensitivity to tail definition
Throughout the above, we have set the CVaR threshold α = 0.916 such that,
in the model objective, the two endogenously selected highest-cost scenarios
received a higher weight. This threshold value is in line with what is typically
used in most research studies; however, for a better understanding of how far our
results are driven by a limited number of scenarios, here we present results from
a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter. Figure 9 shows changes
in two selected technologies, CT and wind, as well as changes in generation
and transmission investment costs with respect to the risk-neutral solution for
different values of α and ω.
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We find that most of our conclusions regarding the effect risk aversion on
generation and transmission investments remain valid for larger values of α.
Although absolute levels of investments in generation per technology change as
we increase α, the results show that increasing risk aversion (i.e., giving more
weight to the CVaR by increasing ω and less to the expected system cost in the
objective function) leads to more investments in wind capacity and less in CT
for all the values of α shown in the figure. Similarly, more risk aversion leads
to higher investment costs in aggregate generation capacity and in transmission
infrastructure. This is consistent with our analysis in Section 5.2, since the
scenarios with the highest costs are those with high renewable requirements.
Generation and transmission investment by state show small differences. As
expected, including a larger number of scenarios on the CVaR mostly reduces
the difference between a risk-neutral and risk-averse, although the changes are
non-monotonic. For smaller values of ω, the differences are even smaller.
Figure 9: Changes in CT and wind investments as well as in generation and transmission
investment costs with respect to the risk-neutral solution for different values of the confidence
level α. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of scenarios included in the CVaR
calculation for each α.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the effects of risk aversion on electricity
generation and transmission planning in a large network. Hitherto, most studies
focused on either transmission or generation planning; as we have shown above,
there are important interactions between the effects of risk aversion on both of
these, so a combined approach is clearly needed. Most existing studies also focus
on small test cases. However, these cannot be used to fully capture the spatial
differences in investment between risk-neutral and risk-averse models which,
based on our results, can also be relevant. We have shown how a risk-averse
Stackelberg transmission-generation expansion equilibrium is equivalent to a
risk-averse cost minimization under some reasonable assumptions, and applied
this model to a 240-bus representation of the WECC network.
Our results indicate that, at least for our parametrization, risk aversion has
only a small impact on overall levels of transmission and generation investment,
because minor adjustments to investment patterns already reduce risk signifi-
cantly, thus limiting further hedging possibilities. In addition, extreme scenarios
already drive much of the results of a risk-neutral model. Although in our model
overall investment levels do not change much, there are significant regional im-
pacts, mainly because of a shift from carbon-intensive to carbon-neutral gen-
eration and a changed transmission investment pattern that anticipates these
developments in new generation capacity. This highlights the importance of
considering risk aversion in planning models, especially if these are used for
policy making. Importantly, the effect of risk aversion on investment in partic-
ular technologies or in particular places is often non-monotonic because of the
complex interactions between renewable policies and between generation and
transmission investment. This implies that they will be hard to predict and
that they are sensitive to particular assumptions about investors’ attitudes to
risk and other constraints, such as renewable targets.
Naturally, our model is still simplified. Because we assume a perfectly com-
petitive generation market and a complete financial market, our model misses
some of the strategic interaction between investors that occur in the real world.
We may also overestimate investment as a result of not taking into account that
financial markets are, in reality, incomplete. Moreover, we only consider a one-
stage game with annualized investment costs, which implies that investors only
live with the results of bad decisions for one year, which could well underesti-
mate the magnitude of a real regret. We also assume that all generators and the
transmission planner have the same attitude to risk. Further research into the
application of multi-level equilibrium models to risk-averse energy investment
applications is necessary to investigate the impact of these simplifications. Nev-
ertheless, our results are consistent with theory and anecdotal evidence, and we
expect the same effects that we find to carry over to models with more detailed
market representations or fine-grained time dimensions.
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Appendix B. Risk-neutral results
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Figure B.10: Generation investments per state and technology for the risk-neutral solution.
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Figure B.11: Transmission investments per state for the risk-neutral solution.
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